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-2-

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSRRivalry Between MALENKOV and ZHDANOV

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[redacted] military authorities played a more important role prior to the latter part of 1947 or the early part of 1948 in determining projects assigned by the MCEI, while politicians later played the predominating role in these policy decisions. This does not mean that the military aspects of work performed at Institute 160 were diminished in any way but simply that, prior to this turning point in 1947 or 1948, the important consideration was to carry out the tasks assigned to Institute 160 and to accomplish them by the best qualified people, whether they were Party members or not. Later on, the political affiliations or activities of Soviet engineers became an important consideration in assigning them to leading positions at Institute 160 and the MCEI.

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[redacted] Soviet industrial ministries were reorganized in the middle of 1947. Prior to this reorganization, MALENKOV had been responsible for directing various high-priority projects in ministries connected with the Soviet aviation industry. In this capacity, he had been over-all director of the Radar Committee and thus had played an important role in the operation of the Soviet electronics industry.

3.

MALENKOV was presumably divested of these responsibilities as a result of this reorganization. Nothing was heard of him at Institute 160 for a period after this reorganization took place. It was rumored by some high-placed Soviet employees at the institute that ZHDANOV was now (1947-48) playing an important role in the affairs of the ministry, that he was responsible for directives guiding the work of the ministry.

4.

At the same time (the fall of 1947 or early 1948), YELIZAROV replaced KATZMANN as chief engineer of the Main Administration for Vacuum Techniques.² Several [redacted] Soviet colleagues at Institute 160 claimed that YELIZAROV was a "ZHDANOV man". They claimed that a rivalry for power existed between ZHDANOV and MALENKOV and that the 1947 reorganization had allowed ZHDANOV to gain in power at the expense of MALENKOV. At any rate, it was clear that, before YELIZAROV assumed the job as chief engineer, hardly a word was said about ZHDANOV at Institute 160. Some well-informed Soviet engineers in the institute had considered MALENKOV to be the likely successor to Stalin prior to the 1947 reorganization and the events that followed. With the appearance of YELIZAROV as chief engineer, all talk centered around ZHDANOV as the most influential person next to Stalin and as Stalin's likely successor.

25X1

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[redacted] Soviet colleagues considered ZHDANOV to be a strong Party man, a person who was more concerned with his subordinates' Party standing than with their technical ability. This same characteristic was attributed to YELIZAROV. MALENKOV, on

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

25X1

the other hand, was looked upon as a man who was more concerned with getting a job done than with secondary political considerations, a man who respected and utilized the professional abilities of technicians regardless of their political backgrounds.

6. At any rate, it was true that, after YELIZAROV came to power, Soviet employees at Institute 160 were expected to demonstrate more active participation in political activities. More important, many Soviet specialists (especially Jews) who had no strong Party affiliations were demoted and replaced by individuals in better standing with the Party. ZUZMANOVSKIY lost his position as scientific director of the institute in early 1948 and was demoted to section chief in charge of the development of magnetrons. Other positions in the institute and in the MOEI were reputedly filled by individuals with stronger political ties than their predecessors. The fact in itself that YELIZAROV replaced KATZMANN was a strong indication of this trend. The latter, a Soviet Jew, was a skilled engineer and was regarded as an "engineer's man."
7. ZUZMANOVSKIY and several other engineers at Institute 160 had served during the war with YELIZAROV at a research institute located in Leningrad. ZUZMANOVSKIY referred to YELIZAROV as a "ZHDANOV man" and indicated that the former had been on good terms with ZHDANOV when the latter was in charge of the defense of Leningrad. ZUZMANOVSKIY related that the staff of this Leningrad institute had originally been exempted from military and civil defense service during the siege because of the high-priority nature of their work. YELIZAROV, with ZHDANOV's support, had insisted however that the institute staff work on the construction of defense positions in Leningrad during their free time. Because of this, YELIZAROV was regarded with some hatred by ZUZMANOVSKIY and others who had been in Leningrad at the time. ZUZMANOVSKIY referred to him as the "bloodsucker of Leningrad".
8. ZHDANOV was equally disliked by this group of engineers at Institute 160 because of his emphasis on political conformity and his conduct during the defense of Leningrad. No doubt many of my Soviet colleagues at Institute 160 were pleased to hear of ZHDANOV's death in 1948 as most were then convinced that he would be successful in succeeding Stalin as ruler of the USSR.
9. The question of Stalin's successor was the subject of surprisingly much talk at Institute 160 in recent years. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] MALENKOV, BERIYA, and MOLOTOV have been considered the main contenders in recent years. MOLOTOV was generally considered too old to be considered seriously as Stalin's successor. Most guessing by [redacted] Soviet colleagues centered around BERIYA and MALENKOV. The latter was considered to be the most likely choice because of his youth. 25X1

SECRET

SECRET

-4-

25X1

Anti-Semitism and "Cosmopolite" Purge

10. [redacted] strong anti-Semitic sentiments among the Great Russian inhabitants at Fryazino and the Great Russian employees at Institute 160, [redacted] 25X1
- [redacted] talking with this man over a couple of drinks about Germany's guilt for its acts under the Nazi regime prior to and during World War II. [redacted] the mass murder of Jews was the worst crime of the Nazi regime. The Soviet, who was a little drunk, answered, "No, no, that's not so! Hitler's worst crime was his attack on the Soviet Union. As far as the Jews are concerned, that was a good thing. Hitler should have killed as many of them as possible." 25X1
11. The Soviets criticized Soviet Jews for sticking together and helping each other out in avoiding hard work and finding soft jobs. For example, the Soviets at the institute complained that the entire staff at the Fryazino Hospital was Jewish. (However, these sentiments probably went much deeper, and were based on historical animosities.) These criticisms were to some degree true. Soviet Jews as a group were more ambitious and a greater percentage of them worked their way up to leading positions than members of other Soviet nationality groups. Then, too, they did tend to stick together somewhat, probably because of the hostility they encountered.
12. [redacted] perhaps 60 per cent of the Soviet technical intelligentsia employed there were of Jewish descent. This percentage later diminished somewhat with the influx of recent university graduates. Although anti-Semitism on the part of Soviets was apparent [redacted] at Institute 160, it noticeably increased in 1948, during an organized campaign apparently directed against Soviet Jews, and increased in intensity thereafter. 25X1
- In 1948, after YELIZAROV came to power (there is probably no connection between the two events), many Soviet Jews in leading positions at Institute 160 were replaced by Russians. Jews who were replaced were almost invariably given lower positions or were transferred to other enterprises. As noted before, ZUZMANOVSKIY was demoted to section chief. Although he later received a top job as scientific consultant at Institute 160, it should be noted that this position carried with it no responsibility for supervising personnel. Approximately one-third of all Jewish section chiefs were demoted. The other Jewish section chiefs as well as Jewish engineers in lower positions were not affected by this move, as more could not be done in this direction without adversely affecting the work of the institute. Finally, some Jewish shop chiefs in the plant attached to Institute 160 were demoted. The only top Soviet official of Jewish descent at Institute 160 who was left in his position was GINSBURG, the business director of the institute. 25X1
13. [redacted] Germans at the institute gained the distinct impression that this wholesale demotion of Soviet Jews was the result of a systematic policy and was not simply coincidental. It 25X1

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SECRET

-5-

25X1

is entirely possible that this action against Jews began as early as the fall of 1947 when KATZMANN was replaced by YELI-ZAROV. KATZMANN, a Jew, was transferred to Novosibirsk (a step which could only be regarded as a demotion) and one of his chief assistants (also Jewish) in the MCEI was assigned at that time to a low position at Institute 160.

14. It is noteworthy that at the time of this anti-Jewish action (1948), Soviet employees at the institute became more outspoken in expressing their anti-Semitic sentiments. Perhaps they found more courage to speak in this manner because of the fact that many of their former bosses were now occupying lower positions. [redacted] this was the result of careful Party policy. [redacted] Soviet authorities indirectly attacked the Jews at local Party meetings and also spread rumors or covert propaganda directed against this minority group. After public opinion had thus been aroused, the government was free to act openly against the Jews. This, incidentally, was an old trick of the Nazis: to arouse public opinion by means of government-sponsored propaganda and later to "respond to the will of the masses". 25X1
15. [redacted] the Soviet government carried out a systematic anti-Semitic policy because it regarded Soviet Jews as foreigners and therefore untrustworthy. Furthermore, Jews, because of their cultural ties with the West and their religion, represented a group who were less susceptible to Communist Party indoctrination, less likely to accept Stalin's dogma and dogmatism than other elements of the Soviet population. Soviet authorities, therefore, felt compelled to destroy or to decrease the power of this element in order to strengthen their power. 25X1
16. ZUZMANOVSKIY, himself a Jew, gave essentially the same explanation of Russian anti-Semitism. He claimed that Russians were suspicious of all foreigners and that they regarded Jews as foreigners because of their cultural traditions. [redacted] how it is possible that a man like BERIYA could carry out or have a part in a state policy of anti-Semitism. It was widely rumored by the Soviet workers at Institute 160 that BERIYA was Jewish. 25X1
17. It is interesting to note that at the beginning [redacted] the Soviet employees were pleasant and friendly to the German specialists but the Soviet Jews were understandably cool. [redacted] Later on, the Soviet Jews were friendlier [redacted] than the Soviets, primarily because they learned that not all Germans were anti-Semitic. This tendency became even more pronounced with the initiation of the anti-Semitic campaign. It is true, of course, that the language barrier was a factor in this consideration. Most Soviet Jews spoke Yiddish and were thus able to converse with the Germans without great difficulty. 25X1
18. The Soviet Jews at Institute 160 never talked about the establishment of Israel as a state. The subject was too ticklish. Moreover, none of the Jews [redacted] openly recognized the existence of an anti-Semitic movement in the USSR. 25X1

SECRET

SECRET

-6-

25X1

Postwar Purges of Soviet Scientists

19. [] Soviet colleagues said little or nothing about postwar purges of intellectuals in the Soviet Union. In fact, news broadcasts from RIAS and BBC were [] only sources of information concerning the so-called LYSENKO purge. []
 the victims of these purges are still engaged in scientific research, even if they are confined in special forced labor camps set aside for such individuals. [] assumption on the probable fate of a German specialist, Dr. FOGY, who was arrested at Institute 160. Although FOGY was never seen [] after his arrest, he wrote several letters to his wife prior to her repatriation to Germany in 1950. The first [] letter was evidently written in a rather desperate state of mind. In later letters, however, he stated that he was working again and hinted that he was engaged in his profession. [] received several measuring instruments at Institute 160, several years after FOGY's arrest, which bore the distinct stamp of his work. Finally, his wife received 500 rubles from him shortly before her departure to Germany. It is hardly likely that FOGY would have been in a position to send such a sum of money if he were not engaged in remunerative work. []

Arrest of Former Ostarbeiter

20. Soviet employees at Institute 160 seldom compared living conditions abroad with those in the USSR, as those who were in a position to do so (discharged soldiers and other returnees) were evidently closely watched by the Party and security police. Persons who had lived abroad were aware that they were under observation and so were afraid to speak about such matters. For example, Soviet engineers who had been employed in Germany after the war were singled out for special attention by the local Party organization. This observation was not relaxed until the Party authorities were certain that these people had not been contaminated by their tour of duty abroad.
21. [] many or most of former Ostarbeiter (Soviets employed in Germany during the war) are now in Soviet forced labor camps. At least it was true that Ostarbeiter employed at Institute 160 were treated with even greater distrust than former members of the Soviet occupation force in Germany. They were pre-judged by state and Party authorities as Nazi collaborators. Moreover, three former Ostarbeiter employed as workers at Institute 160 were arrested and disappeared []
 [] they had been arrested because they had been Ostarbeiter and not because of any other extraneous reason. [] such arrests were not unusual, that many former Ostarbeiter had been arrested and confined to forced labor camps. []

Forced Labor Camp in Fryazino

22. Approximately 200 male and female prisoners, ranging in age from about 18 to 35, were confined in a forced labor camp located in Fryazino. These inmates were in all likelihood criminal and not political prisoners. Their labor was confined to construction work in the Fryazino area. As a matter of

SECRET

SECRET

-7-

25X1

fact, all building and street construction carried out in Fryazino from 1946 to 1951 was done by prisoners of this camp. The prisoners, in groups of 30 to 40, marched to work down the streets of Fryazino under the watchful eyes of three or four uniformed guards. The townspeople took little note of these groups of prisoners and presumably regarded the existence of the camp as a perfectly normal situation.

23. The camp, consisting of simple wooden barracks surrounded by barbed wire enclosures, was located next to the local movie house (near the railway tracks) at the end of the town. An observer could see by charts posted on the walls of the barracks that the prisoners, like all other Soviet workers, had their production norms to fulfill.
24. The camp was dissolved in 1951. It was rumored that this step had been taken because Soviet regulations prohibited the maintenance of a forced labor camp in an incorporated town or city. In support of this theory, it is interesting to note that Fryazino was incorporated as a town in approximately 1950 (it had formerly been classified as a workers' settlement).

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SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND LEADERS

The Soviet Regime

25. [redacted] the broad masses of the Soviet population [redacted] passive in respect to the Soviet regime, predisposed neither to opposition nor strong support of their government. [redacted] few convinced Communists and almost no out-and-out opponents of Communism. These Soviet citizens who expressed opposition to the regime [redacted] were mostly persons, like ZUZMANOVSKIY, who rejected life in general.

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26. [redacted] some chance conversations with natives of Fryazino which throw some light on this matter. [redacted] Some of these individuals, a little in their cups, remarked confidentially they "never had it better" when occupied by the German army during the war. [redacted] Fryazino had been occupied briefly by forward German tank columns. It marked the high point of the German advance on the central front.

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27. Two factors should be kept in mind in evaluating the attitude of the mass of the Soviet people toward their government. First, the small but continual economic progress which has been achieved in the Soviet Union, has allayed unrest on that score. Secondly, much of what is bad in the Soviet system is explained away by the existence of an antagonistic non-communist world. That is, capitalist encirclement compels the Soviet state to maintain large armed forces, thus reducing the standard of living, and forces it to maintain vigilance against capitalist agents and internal enemies, thus reducing personal freedom.

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SECRET

-8-

25X1

28. Although it is possible that there are signs of unrest in the Soviet Union, [redacted] In the event of another world war, each and every Soviet citizen would fight to defend his fatherland; not the fatherland of socialism but the Russian fatherland. Moreover, [redacted] no possibility of a change in the Soviet government brought about by a revolution from within. Government controls are too strong and the Soviet people are too passive for this to take place. The Soviet regime will fall only as a result of war. 25X1
29. It was extremely difficult to determine if the intelligentsia was more in favor of or more opposed to the Communist regime than the mass of the population. This difficulty was the result of a clear pattern of Soviet life. The higher a person climbed on the economic and social ladder, the more anxious he was about losing his job and the more cautious he was about expressing his honest opinion. A worker could openly complain about the government, at least about petty matters, without fearing the consequences. Repetitive behaviour of this type on the part of an individual in a leading position could only result in his downfall. 25X1
30. It is interesting to note in this connection that many German specialists at the institute had Soviet mistresses despite the fact that such relationships were discouraged by Soviet authorities. All of these mistresses were working-class women. No woman in a higher position, an engineer for example, would have dared to flaunt the unofficial regulation forbidding this practice.

Soviet Leaders

31. Lenin was all but deified by almost all Soviets. [redacted] the remark from Soviet colleagues and acquaintances, "If Lenin had lived, things would have been better." They looked back on the middle years of the Soviet regime, the years up to and including 1934, as the "good old days". They remembered with fondness the shorter working week and other favorable conditions which characterized this period and identified them with Lenin's policies. 25X1 25X1
32. [redacted] a mixed attitude toward Stalin on the part of the Soviet population. It was certainly apparent that he was held in no such esteem as Lenin. [redacted] infer from the above quote regarding Lenin that Stalin was held responsible for many undesirable developments in Soviet society and system of government. Nevertheless, Stalin was regarded by most Soviet citizens as an outstanding personality. Although most Soviet citizens seemed to recognize that life could be better than their present lot, Stalin was given credit for his undeniable achievements in establishing the Soviet Union as a world power. 25X1 25X1
33. The attitudes of my Soviet colleagues toward MALENKOV and ZHDANOV have been discussed in an earlier section. [redacted] friends and acquaintances seldom spoke about MOLOTOV. 25X1

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-9-

BERIYA, for some reason or other, enjoyed a good reputation among the Soviet employees at Institute 160. Some of them claimed that individuals had written to BERIYA appealing for aid in solving a personal problem or correcting an injustice and that he had swiftly intervened and settled matters satisfactorily. These same people stated that it was also possible to appeal to Stalin in such matters but that action was slow in processing these appeals through a long chain of command.

34. They related that an engineer employed at Institute 160 had been near to death as a result of an advanced case of tuberculosis. The local hospital had rejected this man's request for the application of an American drug against tuberculosis because it was considered too expensive. The engineer reportedly wrote to BERIYA and appealed for aid. BERIYA had acquired the drug within a short time, but only enough for one-half of a cure. The man's life was prolonged by several years before he finally died.

Aspects of Soviet System Receiving Overt Praise and Criticism

35. [] contacts in the Soviet Union seldom if ever directed complaints against the government itself. Most complaints were directed against high prices. The men were dissatisfied with the price of vodka and the women were unhappy with the prices of all consumer goods. Pay and working conditions also came in for their share of verbal dissatisfaction. But bosses at the institute rather than the system itself were held responsible for this state of affairs. [] Soviet acquaintances also frequently criticized America and America's foreign policy. At times it appeared that the United States was responsible for everything that was wrong in the Soviet Union and in the world at large.

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36. On the other side of the picture, [] Soviet colleagues and acquaintances were proud of the growing strength of the Soviet Union, in particular its achievements in industrialization as epitomized by the widely advertised construction of skyscrapers in Moscow. They were also proud of the astounding improvement in living conditions which has been achieved in the Soviet Union since 1946. And, locally, Moscow as a cultural center, with its magnificent musical concerts and great artists, was regarded with deep pride. All of these points could be effectively attacked directly or indirectly by Western propagandists, with the exception of the Soviet's pride in their cultural achievements. The worst way in which one could insult a Soviet, even the simplest worker, was to call him uncultured or to claim that the Soviet peoples possess no cultural achievements of the past and present.

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Soviet Propaganda

37. The bulk of the Soviet population apparently believed anything which appeared in the Soviet press or which was broadcast by other Soviet information media. When several Soviets engaged in a debate about something or other, the clinching phrase always cropped up, "But it must be true; it's in the newspaper."

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SECRET
-10-

25X1

38. For example, the average Soviet worker thoroughly believed that the stage of Communism would be achieved according to the old Marxist formula, "to each according to his needs". He believed that when communism is achieved he will be able to go into a shop, take home a shirt without paying a cent, and throw it away after he grows tired of it. In fact, many Soviet workers frequently said that after the completion of the present Five-Year Plan, bread will be so plentiful that it will be distributed free of charge to every inhabitant in the Soviet Union.
39. The average Soviet worker apparently believed in the truthfulness of the Soviet press, despite the fact that much of what they read in the press was contradicted by everyday experiences. This fact did not seem to make any impression on the Soviet masses. They were too indifferent. The average Soviet was so downtrodden that the government could publish anything in the press and make him believe it.
40. The system even had visible effects on the group of German specialists at Institute 160 during their relatively brief sojourn in the Soviet Union. At first [] stormed the director's office with protests about various injustices, sent delegations with petitions to the director, refused to contribute to state loan drives, et cetera. The Soviet employees at the institute were shocked and amazed at this behaviour and said, "You don't realize what you are doing. This can get you a one-way ticket to Siberia." In the later years, the continual pressure, fear of arrest, and bitter experience (the Soviets were right in their warning) had undermined much of the elan and spirit [] no longer protested when [] paychecks failed to arrive on time or when other working conditions were found to be unsatisfactory. It was much easier to shrug [] and say "nichego" along with the Soviets.

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Elections

41. The main significance of the elections [] in Fryasino was that they were regarded as a reason for celebration. Fantastic drunkenness reigned in the streets of the town on election days as the workers readily availed themselves of the opportunity of buying from the well-stocked supplies of vodka at presumably lower prices. The intelligentsia in no way regarded elections as important, were under no illusions that these elections decided anything. They demonstrated no interest in the elections as such but considered voting as a duty or necessary evil.

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Foreign Relations

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42. [] no criticism of Soviet foreign policies from [] Soviet colleagues and acquaintances. They apparently held the same opinion of their government's foreign policies as put forth in official propaganda. They regarded with approval the expansion of Soviet power in the Eastern Hemisphere. In particular, they greeted with genuine enthusiasm the Communist victory in China. These acquaintances frequently expressed the opinion that with so many more millions of people under communist rule, the time was short when the Communist revolution would be extended throughout the entire world.

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SECRET

-11-

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All Soviets took it for granted that the European satellite states, including the GDR, would one day become republics of the USSR.

43. The existence of the so-called Iron Curtain was recognized [redacted] and met with a facile explanation. 25X1
It was regarded as a natural defense erected by the Soviet Union against the infiltration of capitalist agents. They explained that the capitalist countries wish to rob the Soviet Union of all its achievements attained under socialism.

44. [redacted] the opinion of the average Soviet regarding the United States also corresponded to the official propaganda line. He accepted the official Soviet conception of the United States as a true characterization. Of this whole complex of crude concepts, capitalism, exploitation of the working class, aggressive foreign policy, and racial discrimination, it is remarkable that the latter point made a particularly strong impression on the minds of my Soviet acquaintances. However, it was true that all groups, workers and intelligentsia alike, admired the technical achievements of the United States and sought to emulate them as far as this was possible. The technical intelligentsia was quite aware of the superiority of American industry. Many workers were evidently of the opinion that the Soviet Union has achieved with its most recent Five-Year Plan the same level of industrialization as the United States and will surpass it during the coming five years. 25X1

45. No credit was given to American wartime and postwar aid. The Soviet citizenry was firmly convinced that they, and only they, had won the war and, moreover, could have done so without American aid. [redacted] struck by the fact that almost all canned food distributed to the German specialists in 1946 had been produced in the United States. This evidence of American generosity seemed to have had no effect on the current thinking of the Soviet population. Either they were not aware of such aid at the time it was made available or have forgotten about it in the intervening five years. 25X1

Korean War

46. The mass of workers at Institute 160 believed that the United States began the war in Korea and that the mean Americans were responsible for all this bloodshed. They, of course, identified themselves with the "good side", the North Koreans. During the first months of the war, Soviet employees of the institute hung maps of Korea on the walls of the various offices and laboratories and followed the progress of the war with great interest. However, these maps disappeared overnight when the tide turned and the Americans gained the upper hand.
47. The mass of workers in the institute also believed charges of American atrocities and bacteriological warfare in Korea and China. Even such highly placed personnel as the business director of the institute repeated and seemingly believed stories of American brutality. [redacted] the 25X1

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25X1

SECRET

-12-

Soviet population had a natural tendency to believe such atrocity accusations, as brutality was characteristic of life in the Soviet Union. They viewed the outside world in the image of their own. Furthermore, rumors spread throughout the institute that the Americans had distributed germs in the Soviet Union. Once during an influenza epidemic, the rumor was started that American planes had dropped bacteria in the Fryazino area and were to blame for the illness. 25X1

48. It is noteworthy that these rumors always cropped up after Party meetings had been held at the institute. It is very possible that such rumors originated at these meetings, as they were always discussed by the Soviet workers the next day at work. [redacted] this was another example of covert propaganda carried out by Party or police officials. 25X1

War and Peace

49. [redacted] the entire Soviet population very fearful of a new world war. At one time, 1950 and 1951, this fear developed into a virtual war psychosis in the Fryazino area. The Soviet press had raged so much about the mean Americans and their aggressive plans that the local population evidently felt that their days of peace were numbered. 25X1 any rate, they bought up and hoarded all articles which are normally short in war time. Within two or three days, not a pinch of salt or a piece of soap was available in the entire area. [redacted] this constant reiteration of American aggressive intentions was part of an official policy to maintain control over the Soviet population by playing on their fears of war and simultaneously to build up a hatred of the United States. 25X1
50. [redacted] not aware of any emphasis by official propaganda media on the possibility of coexistence between Communism and capitalism, and my Soviet colleagues evidently did not regard this theory seriously. Every Soviet citizen was convinced that war between the Soviet camp and the West would sooner or later become a reality. All were evidently certain that the United States would be the aggressor in this conflict.
51. The mass of the Soviet population was probably firm in its opinion that the USSR would be victorious in a future world war. They continually read in the Soviet press about the power and might of their country. The technical intelligentsia probably had some doubts in this matter, as they were aware of America's industrial pre-eminence. 25X1

1. [redacted] Comment: MCEI is used throughout this report to refer to the Ministry of Communications Equipment Industry. 25X1
2. [redacted] Comment: [redacted] Katzmann and Yelizarov were successively chief engineer of the second of five administrative groups of the MCEI. [redacted] this second group "the main administration /chief directorate/ for vacuum tube plants".
3. [redacted] Comment: Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriia is a Georgian; to the best of our knowledge, he is not Jewish.

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